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Purpose 
The mismatches between political discourse and military momentum in the American 
handling of the Cuban missile crisis are explained by using the model of the potential 
autopoiesis of subsystems. Under wartime conditions, the codes of political and 
military communications can increasingly be differentiated.  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
The model of a further differentiation between political and military power is 
developed on the basis of a detailed description of the Cuban missile crisis. We 
introduce the concept of a “semi-dormant autopoiesis” for the difference in the 
dynamics between peacetime and wartime conditions. 
 
Findings 
Several dangerous incidents during the crisis can be explained by a sociocybernetic 
model focusing on communication and control, but not by using an organization-
theoretical approach. The further differentiation of the military as a subsystem became 
possible in the course of the twentieth century because of ongoing learning processes 
about previous wars.  
 
Practical implications 
Politicians should not underestimate autonomous military processes or the 
significance of standing orders. In order to continually produce communications 
within the military, communication partners are needed that stand outside of the 
hierarchy, and this role can be fulfilled by an enemy. A reflexively imagined enemy 
can thus reinforce the autopoiesis of the military subsystem. 
 
Originality/value 
The paper shows that civilian control over military affairs has become structurally 
problematic and offers a sociocybernetic explanation of the missile crisis. The 
potential alternation in the dynamics under peacetime and wartime conditions brings 
historical specificity back on the agenda of social systems theory. 
 
Keywords: functional differentiation, missile crisis, Cold War, military, sociocybernetics, 
autopoiesis 
 
Introduction 
 
The development of military technologies and the increased capability of states to 
mobilize young men for their armies sparked an unparalleled military race after the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and the subsequent unification of Germany. This arms race 
went hand in hand with a strong rationalization of the army. During the period leading up 
to the First World War, western countries developed chiefs of staff, rigid chains of 
command, secret codes, and so on. During the Second World War these organizational 
innovations were further elaborated, reaching a culmination during the Cold War. 
However rational such developments may seem from a military perspective—bearing in 
mind the degree of international competition and the mutual threat—they increasingly 
reconstructed the military into a system virtually black-boxed for political control, with its 
own language, authority, regulations, and secrets. Because of the military’s enormous 
powers of destruction, such independence can have drastic consequences. President 
Eisenhower has become well known for his warnings against uncontrollable military 
pressures in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock of 1957 (York, 1970).  
 
The danger of a mismatch between military momentum and political control was painfully 
demonstrated during the Cuban missile crisis, when the U.S. military heads were operating 
with an agenda different from that of the Kennedy administration, and generally seem to 
have misunderstood Kennedy’s intentions. In this study, we examine the difficulties that 
the administration had in communicating its intentions and exercising effective control 
over the U.S. military forces. These problems and misunderstandings almost propelled the 
world inadvertently into World War III. We argue that these difficulties can be attributed 
to systemic differences between military and political modes of communication. By using 
Niklas Luhmann’s sociological theory of communication, American politics and its 
military will be analyzed as systems of communication with different codes (Luhmann, 
1984).  
 
The aims of this study are twofold. An attempt is made to contribute to sociocybernetic 
theory by examining, in a post-World War II situation, the differences and relations 
between politics and military operations. The tensions between these two modes of 
operation within the power-structure have been largely ignored in literature of social 
systems theory because insufficient distinction has been made between peacetime and 
wartime conditions. By analyzing the dangerous behavior of the U.S. government and 
military during the Cuban missile crisis we wish secondly to show that a systems-
theoretical perspective provides more explanatory power than previous accounts of this 
same case. At present, the authoritative account of the Cuban missile crisis is Graham T. 
Allison’s (1971) The Essence of Decision. In this study Allison employed three separate 
models of analysis or paradigms in order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of these 
models for political analysis and to shed light on different aspects of the Cuban missile 
crisis. Of these three models the second, the organizational model, is most significant to 
our analysis as it provided Allison’s most compelling explanation of the mishaps in the 
behavior of the U.S. government.[1]   
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Allison’s organizational model viewed government action not as the direct result of the 
decisions of government leaders, but rather as the outputs of the large organizations that 
make up the state, such as the Navy, the C.I.A., and the State Department. These 
organizations are “activated” by the decisions of government leaders but otherwise operate 
according to pre-established plans and operating rules that may not be appropriate in every 
situation. This configuration explains the occurrence of many actions that were not 
intended by the political leadership. Equally important, these organizations act as the eyes 
and ears of the government leaders, providing them with information on the problems at 
hand and defining the alternatives open to them, and thereby act as constraints on the 
rationality of government action and the decisions of government leaders. 
 
However convincing this analysis seems, on closer inspection it includes several 
contradictions. These problems are due to the fact that, unlike Luhmann’s sociology, the 
organizational model is not designed to describe interaction in different social contexts—
which is so important to the case at hand—but rather to improve “rational” management. 
The most important of these problems involves the dynamic of political decision making. 
According to the organizational model the decisions of government leaders are mere 
derivatives of organizationally defined alternatives and can therefore be formulated only 
as general instructions. From Allison’s own study, however, it becomes very clear that the 
Kennedy administration did have very specific wishes and demands that differed 
significantly from the proposals of the army organizations. The dynamic which produced 
these wishes and demands will be examined here. Furthermore, we will show that there 
are no indications of differences in perspectives among the Navy, the Ground Forces, and 
the Air Force officials as one would have expected on the basis of Allison’s model. On 
these grounds and others that will become apparent in the course of the discussion below, 
we propose that the potentially fatal incidents of the Cuban missile crisis can more fully be 
explained within a sociocybernetic framework, that is, as the result of structural 
differences between political and military communications. 
 
Two Shapes of Power 
 
In the way the term is conventionally understood, the possession and processing of 
“power” is undoubtedly the main defining element of both politics and the military. 
In the case of the Cuban missile crisis this power presented itself most vividly in the 
ability of the American and the Soviet leadership to order the deaths of many millions of 
people, thereby effectively ordering the destruction of their adversary’s society. Both 
militaries would have been able to execute such an Armageddon in a matter of hours, if 
not less. Although potentially present, this most extreme form of power use has 
fortunately never been actualized on this scale in the history of the world.   
 
The conventional understanding of “power” is not identical to the way in which Luhmann 
(1990a, 2000) employs the term. In his sociological analysis power is considered as a 
symbolically generalized medium of inter-human communications (Parsons, 1963a), and 
the political system as the specialized social system in which power is processed and 
“legitimately” expressed. According to Luhmann (1990a: 167) the core function of politics 
is to make “collectively binding decisions.” Power must therefore be seen as the tool that 
mediates between the different interests or opinions that compete to form these 
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collectively binding decisions. Perhaps mindful of the analysis of the famous German 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1832), who proposed to see military force as simply 
an extension of politics, scholars using this perspective have not felt the need to make a 
distinction between political and military operations, or to consider the potential difference 
in these relations under wartime and peacetime conditions.  
  
We propose that Von Clausewitz’s subjection of military action and war to political 
objectives is not a timeless constant. We intend to show that the military’s hierarchical 
dependence on politics gave way to a functional independence under relatively recent 
historical conditions. This independence signaled the emergence of a “power”-processing 
subsystem of society able to compete with politics. As an analogous development, we 
point to the gradual separation of science from religion as a “truth”-processing system 
(Luhmann, 1990b) and the serious competition between the two that has resulted from this 
separation, e.g., the conflicts between the theory of evolution and creationism.[2] 
  
If military operations presently no longer would conform to the creation of collectively 
binding decision making and can under certain conditions operate independently of the 
political system, we have to offer a differentiated functionalist definition of power and 
consider this differentiated power as the determinant of the functions of two societal 
subsystems. Parsons (1963a) defined power in social systems as one among the 
symbolically generalized media of communication. From the perspective of society as a 
whole, power allows society to continually make selections out of a host of self-
referentially produced alternatives for its future course (Luhmann, 2000). For those who 
employ it, and for every instance in which it is employed, power functions in a relative 
sense because other options remain available. Power comes into play when there is some 
form of resistance or challenge, that is, when alternatives to the existing order present 
themselves. In an environment of competing power-wielding units (i.e., an organization 
such as a state, a movement, an individual) supporting certain alternatives, the power of 
such a unit can then be defined as its ability to curb or subdue resistance, or in other 
words: the ability to diminish, prevent or destroy communications enacting competing 
alternatives in the unit’s environment.[3]  
 
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union could be considered as 
competing units representing alternatives for organizing society at the generalized level. 
The power of these two systems lied in their relative abilities to diminish or destroy each 
other’s type of social coordination. Use of such power could be directed at the producers 
of the other unit’s communications (i.e., people and institutions), the media through which 
potential communications run (e.g., telephone lines, train tracks), and the carriers of 
previous messages that can serve to perpetuate the specific mode of communication (i.e., 
codes of law, textbooks, literature, culturally significant buildings or statues, etc.). Specific 
attention would be directed at opposing the other unit’s specialized power-wielding 
functions. 
  
Whereas politics and the military both wield power as defined above, their functions can 
become differently defined. Power as a medium can be split into two forms. The first is 
the ability to diminish or destroy other units while taking over constituent elements or the 
media of communications of other units in order to have these other units perform and 
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participate in accordance with the dominant alternative, which comes down to collectively 
binding decision making. The second is the ability to diminish or destroy other units 
without enlarging one’s own mode of communication, i.e., by annihilating constituent 
elements or media of the other unit. This produces no collectively binding decisions as it 
destroys that which would be part of the collective. Instead, it is designed to produce a 
tabula rasa of death or complete submission. Whereas political discourse is designed to 
produce active participation in alternatives and partnership, the military aims to produce 
silent passivity in the enemy.  
 
In the American and Soviet context at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, this distinction 
between hegemony and annihilation had become sharp enough for these two forms of 
power to be wielded by two different subsystems of society. The first form had as its 
institutional custodian the political subsystem of society and the military subsystem had 
been specialized to organize the second form of power. One should realize that in this 
model politics and the military, when developed beyond the incipient state of a means-
ends relation, are only subsystems in the sense that the sum total of their operations 
continues to perform a common function towards society as a whole under the condition 
of peace. Under the extreme pressure of war or a serious threat of war, however, they have 
the potential to operate as fully developed subsystems, i.e., as self-organizing systems of 
communication. While they normally strive to maintain and organize their own modes of 
communication and not necessarily to perform a function to the exclusion of each other’s 
mode of discourse, the two subsystems are organized in institutional arrangements through 
which they compete in contributing to the function of organizing power in society under 
wartime conditions.  
 
The potentially ongoing processes of differentiation imply that relations between the 
subsystems can change, turn sour, and even degenerate into a power struggle at a 
subsocietal level. Both these operations rely heavily on the societal framework in which 
they are embedded and on the functions they perform in that society for their maintenance 
and reproduction. The differentiation between politics and the military, however, can 
produce tensions that are dysfunctional for society at large. The systemic insistence on 
self-maintenance can become particularly counterproductive or even dangerous when 
society’s needs change. The two competing subsystems can be expected to provide these 
changes with different interpretations. 
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis: a brief account 
 
When John F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States in November 1960 the 
Cold War seemed to enter a lukewarm stage. After numerous conflicts during the fifties, 
among them the Korean War, the two superpowers were more prepared to settle their 
differences through diplomatic channels. However, a few thorny issues remained on both 
sides. Behind the Iron Curtain, West Berlin was still a capitalist stronghold, and Cuba 
gave the Soviet Union a footing in the Western hemisphere. In 1961, one year before the 
crisis, the communists erected the Berlin wall, and exiled Cubans attempted an invasion of 
Cuba with American support. This latter undertaking would become known as the Bay of 
Pigs disaster.  
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The blame for this fiasco provided a hard bone of contention between Kennedy’s 
administration and the military chiefs, who would afterwards live in strong mutual distrust 
(Brugioni, 1990: 260). These events also made “Cuba” and “Berlin” even more politically 
sensitive on both sides of the ideological divide. Pressures built up inside the U.S.A. to 
have the administration rid the western hemisphere of the Cuban Revolution, or at least to 
prevent the island from becoming a forward Soviet military base. Across the Atlantic, 
Western European countries expressed the fear that the Americans would not risk a 
nuclear war to prevent a Soviet encroachment on Berlin or other areas, especially if the 
Soviets could launch a devastating strike from Cuba. This configuration led Kennedy to 
issue two public statements in September 1962 that any introduction of Soviet “offensive” 
weapons into Cuba would not be tolerated (White, 2001: 151-155). 
 
After the Bay of Pigs incident, Cuba’s Fidel Castro repeatedly urged Nikita Khrushchev—
the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—to send weapons to 
Cuba that could prevent a new invasion. Khrushchev sent “defensive” weapons and crews 
to handle them and the United States grudgingly accepted this. At the same time, however, 
members of the Politburo and of the Soviet military establishment were urgently seeking 
means to offset the U.S.’s numerical nuclear superiority. For this reason, and to provide 
the Soviets with a bargaining chip for negotiations on Berlin, missiles and nuclear 
warheads had already been deployed to Cuba at the time Kennedy issued his warnings in 
September 1962 (Khrushchev, 1990: 170-174; Brugioni, 1990: 243-244).  
 
The Soviets had hoped to present the Americans with a fait accompli at the end of the 
year, but their military build-up was discovered on October 15 when it was still in 
progress and when the missiles were not yet operational. When Kennedy was notified the 
following morning, the most dangerous fortnight of the Cold War had commenced. 
Kennedy was convinced that something had to be done, if not for military then for 
political reasons, and convened a group of his closest advisors. This group, later to be 
called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom), deliberated in 
secrecy for a week together with the highest circles of the American military and 
intelligence establishments on the course of action to be taken.  
 
Originally favoring the option of an air strike to remove the missiles by force, the 
deliberations in ExCom slowly shifted towards supporting the less impulsive option of 
instituting a naval blockade to prevent more offensive military equipment from entering 
Cuba. This had the advantage of sending a strong message to the Soviet Union and the rest 
of the world of the determination on the side of the U.S. to see these missiles removed, 
while at the same time leaving the Soviets with some time to deliberate and find a graceful 
exit from the conflict. If the build-up persisted, further steps could still be taken. The main 
disadvantage from the American point of view was of course the fact that the blockade, or 
“quarantine” as is was called, did nothing directly to remove the missiles that were already 
in Cuba or to prevent them from becoming operational. 
 
Kennedy chose to pursue the “prudent” course of a naval quarantine despite the fact that a 
consensus in favor of this option had only been reached painfully within ExCom and that 
the highest military organ, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), persisted in calling for a 
massive air strike followed by an invasion of Cuba. He announced his decision to the 
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American public, the Soviets, and the rest of the world on Monday October 22, one week 
after intelligence officials had first discerned the missile sites from photographs taken by a 
U-2 spy plane. At the moment this televised announcement was made, U.S. military forces 
all over the world moved to Defense Condition 3 (DefCon 3), only two steps away from 
general war. Naval forces moved into position to institute the quarantine, which was to 
take effect on Wednesday morning; the Air Force and infantry were readied to commence 
further action against Cuba; and conventional and strategic (nuclear-armed) forces were 
prepared worldwide for any Soviet retaliation, such as a move against Berlin. 
 
An extremely tense week followed in which the world came very close to a massive 
nuclear war at several moments. With Khrushchev at first unwilling to yield to the 
blockade and Kennedy not prepared to make concessions given the superior American 
nuclear arsenal while under the close scrutiny of the world, the two superpowers were 
moving towards disaster. In the meantime, the two powers frantically tried to employ 
diplomacy bi-laterally, at the United Nations, and with Cuba and Turkey (since Turkey’s 
American missile sites might have to be removed in order to resolve the conflict 
evenhandedly). In addition to confronting each other and the other allies involved, the two 
heads of state also had to deal with their own officials, some of whom seemed to support 
moves which might lead to an escalation.  
 
Several potentially catastrophic incidents occurred which were out of control for the two 
political leaderships. Most of these incidents resulted from the actions and routines of the 
respective militaries. The realization on both sides that these incidents might not have 
been the result of conscious decisions from the respective highest authorities helped 
contain the seriousness of the situation. Another important factor in this respect was the 
tendency to carefully examine alternatives to each proposed action or reaction. Precisely 
this self-restraint in the light of so much threat, and the profound fear and sense of 
responsibility felt by both Kennedy and Khrushchev, paved the way for an eventual 
solution of the crisis. The two superpowers eventually agreed that the missiles and the 
nuclear weapons in Cuba would be removed in return for an American pledge that the 
U.S.A. would never invade Cuba and that the American missiles in Turkey would be 
removed within six months, under the pretext of their obsolescence. With this agreement 
the world as we know it was saved. 
 
The Political Discourse of Persuasion 
 
The eventual conclusion of the Cuban missile crisis may seem to warrant some 
apprehension about the historical seriousness of the conflict. After all, it is hard to believe 
how intelligent and sane people could deliberately enter into a nuclear war. The simplicity 
of the solution and the virtual inconceivability of the terrible alternative the world faced 
could with hindsight mitigate our evaluation of the difficulties involved in reaching this 
prudent course. The evaluative perspective of hindsight, however, would fail to do justice 
to the historic circumstances in which the deliberations were held and, more seriously, 
might make it impossible for us to gain theoretical understanding from these events. 
Furthermore, it would entail an analytical error in examining the actual decision-making 
process in a crisis on the basis of its outcome. On the American side at least, and this side 
will be our focus, many different perspectives and evaluations of priorities emerged, 
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conflicted, and interacted with each other during the process, producing different 
outcomes at different moments during the deliberations. 
 
To see whether or not the model of the political system proposed above is applicable to the 
actual ExCom deliberations, we first need to examine its implications a bit further. The 
form of power that we have assigned to the political system can be summarized under the 
broad heading of “persuasion.” The political system operates at different levels. One of 
these is the level of international relations in which national governments vie for influence 
as units. Of course, it is not enough for government officials to know that they have to 
persuade leaders and people from other nations; they also need to know the content of 
what they have to persuade them. The complex whole of national interests is determined 
by the nation’s dominant modes of interaction. Therefore the political discourse of the 
U.S. requires representations within itself of the other major modes of communication in 
this society. These representations have been institutionalized within the U.S. government 
as departments and committees, but are also present as culturally generalized ethical 
considerations and values. To formulate a “plan to persuade” in complex situations, the 
national units within the political system must attempt to homogenize these very different 
representations contained within them. They need references to their own preferred 
alternatives. 
 
In order to achieve this integration, the system can be expected to create special functions. 
In the United States, the most prominent of these functions is that of the nationally elected 
President. Along these lines, a hierarchical structure is created within the national 
government that can be reflected in the structure of the departments, which are 
differentiated as well. Here the secretary of each department performs the integrative 
function. This hierarchical organization of the state, however, does not reflect a 
hierarchical organization of society as a whole.  
 
Because of the need to keep American knowledge of the missiles in Cuba secret until 
specific action was decided upon, the President, whose moves were always carefully 
followed by the media, had to keep up his regular schedule and was unable to devote all 
his attention to the crisis (May and Zelikow, 2002: 72-73). This meant that another 
mechanism was needed to assist him in integrating the various perspectives and to provide 
him with a limited number of clear alternatives. Such a mechanism was furnished by the 
ad hoc creation of ExCom, mainly organized by the President’s brother, Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy. In attempting to set a course of action, ExCom had to integrate military, 
diplomatic, legal, ethical, and other types of considerations. They continued to do so after 
Kennedy had announced his decision to the world to institute a quarantine. Even though 
the President could now direct all his attention to the crisis, he would keep ExCom for the 
remainder of the crisis and act as its chairman.  
 
Virtually all ExCom meetings were conducted with the secretaries and undersecretaries of 
the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and the Treasury as main participants, together 
with representatives of the United States’ diplomatic services, intelligence community, 
and military. During the deliberations, different topics of a very diverse nature came up. 
Although most attention was directed to military and diplomatic affairs, questions also 
arose about whether the government had the legal authority to order an air strike without a 
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Congressional vote, whether or not there would be demonstrations in Latin American 
capitals against U.S. actions, and about the importance of the opinions of the American 
and British media. A very important argument against the option of an unannounced air 
strike was an ethical and very American one: the United States would be acting against its 
own tradition if it ordered a “Pearl Harbor attack” on Cuba (Brugioni, 1990: 242). 
 
All kinds of issues can enter the political discourse. In terms of systems theory, this ability 
can be called the capacity to handle a great deal of complexity. As in all systems, this 
capacity is achieved through further differentiation; in this case a differentiation of the 
state unit into departments and committees. Handling such a high level of complexity, 
however, also requires a form of communication that can bear the burden by reducing the 
complexity in a functional mode. Much political interaction occurs in the form of threats 
and offers, but within the same unit, the political system achieves this reduction of 
complexity by coding the communication in terms of arguments, advice and 
recommendations as its main forms of interaction. These formats allow the integrative 
mechanisms to assess and weigh very different aspects of a problem. Although external 
interactions can be coded in another system’s form of communication, all representations 
within the political system operate according to this qualitative form. The external systems 
have to be represented within the political discourse even if they use other forms of 
codification internally. For example, the military was represented in ExCom by the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Maxwell Taylor, who had to argue in 
this context with representatives of other interests representing, for example, commercial 
and trade interests in keeping the peace.  
 
Arguments can evoke many possible reactions from other participants in the network. Not 
only can many different types of input be processed by the political system using its 
specific codifications, but the political communications have multitudinous “meanings” 
assigned to them. Each input has a very high meaning density when it enters the political 
system; every input can evoke a large range of responses. Because of this fluid nature of 
political interactions, political decisions are likely to remain provisional, given that new 
input from any direction could add new considerations and that each communication can 
be interpreted inside the system in so many ways. Therefore, unshakeable positions are 
uncommon. As Robert F. Kennedy (1969: 31) would formulate it with hindsight:  
 
“(…) none was consistent in his opinion from the very beginning to the very end. 
That kind of open, unfettered mind was essential.” 
 
Even presidential decisions are prone to the fate of remaining provisional. For example, 
when Kennedy heard that the Soviets demanded the removal of the American missiles in 
Turkey, he became angry because he had ordered the removal of these missiles a year 
before the crisis. However, his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had neglected to arrange the 
removal due to resistance from the Turks (Brugioni, 1990: 466-467). Removing them now 
under Soviet threat could be perceived by the rest of the world as a sign of American 
weakness. At this point in history, the hierarchies within the state could not be very strict, 
because the state, like the political system as a whole, attempts to organize representations 
of a society that was progressively organizing itself less along hierarchic and more along 
functional lines. 
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The continuous fluidity and provisionality of political decision-making stands squarely 
opposed to the military expectation to be provided with a clear definition of objectives. 
However, considering political deliberations as part of a subsystem that is interested 
mainly in persuasion, can account for the way in which American deliberations were 
conducted during the Cuban missile crisis. It also accounts for the common perception of 
politicians as engaging in endless discussions and their tendency to fail to stand firm in 
action.  
 
Military Command and Control 
 
When an international conflict arises, a nation’s political and military leaders are forced to 
work together intensively. This close cooperation does not mean, however, that the one 
discourse can be subsumed as a subsystem to the other as in a means-ends relation. The 
difference in the communicative mode is too fundamental to warrant such a conclusion. 
This difference has crystallized institutionally to the point that the political system needs a 
representation of the military system (institutionalized in Departments of Defense) and the 
military system needs a body to confer with the political system (i.e., the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff). The interface serves a translation between the political discourse that revolves 
around persuasion, and the military mode of communication that revolves around 
destruction, command, and control. 
 
At the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis there already existed a plan for an attack on 
Cuba (Allison 1971: 125). In the planning of such scenarios, the reasons why the plan 
might be undertaken are considered irrelevant. In other words, from a strictly military 
point of view, no justification is required. This rationality is not only shown by the 
military’s extreme belligerence during the crisis, but also by general military traits, such as 
the use of a morally indiscriminate terminology. Terms such as “casualties”, “collateral 
damage”, “rules of engagement” and “Oplans” are relatively devoid of value judgmental 
connotations.  
 
General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff at the time of the crisis, is reported to 
have even shouted “We lost! We ought to just go in there today and knock ‘em off!” when 
he heard that the Soviets had eventually agreed to remove the missiles and that the crisis 
was over (Rhodes, 1995: 575). Although LeMay’s position was extreme even among 
military men, it does prove a point about military interaction. The focus of the military as 
a whole is primarily on the destruction of the enemy’s resistance and on the national 
defense against such destruction. It creates a host of plans for attack and defense, and 
executes those that it is allowed to execute by the government.  
 
LeMay’s counterbalance at the JCS was the chairman, General Taylor, who was also a 
permanent member of ExCom. Taylor had been appointed by President Kennedy himself 
after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and therefore had to keep the political objectives continuously 
in mind. Time and again he would remind the other chiefs of staff of the political 
consequences of the actions they proposed. During these deliberations he would also try to 
explain to them how differently military men and politicians would approach problems, 
usually to little avail (Brugioni, 1990: 262).  
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We thus argue that the military system has an orientation fundamentally different from 
that of the political system and that this military orientation revolves around destruction. 
When competing power-wielding units are considered as systems of interaction, this 
destruction is not necessarily directed at people or physical objects. A blockade, for 
example, destroys the adversary’s lanes of exchange and is therefore a military action, 
even if no physical destruction takes place. It can be compared with recent developments 
in cyber-warfare plans aimed at destroying enemy communication.  
 
From this premise about the rationality prevailing in military communications, several 
implications follow. First, attempts at destruction are bound to meet with fiercer resistance 
from the adversary than attempts at persuasion. Persuasion aims at some agreement by the 
subjects to be persuaded, whereas destruction is inherently perceived as aggressive. This 
makes military action dangerous and increases the stakes for all involved. Secondly, 
destruction is a relatively straightforward process; fewer factors are involved than in the 
case of persuasion, which can be seen as a process of deconstruction and reconstruction of 
legitimacy. Like a political organization, the military requires forms of autoreference and 
reference to its competitor. But unlike a political organization, it does not require 
references to its own preferred alternatives. It is not representative. Consequently, the 
military system can afford to handle less complexity than the political system. These two 
factors are decisive for the main forms of internal interaction employed by organizations 
within this system, which are plans, regulations, and orders.  
 
The restricted types of meaningful input enable the military to devise long-term plans 
(strategy) and work out their plans in great detail and with more stability. Not so many 
factors can significantly disturb military operations. This closure of military interactions 
makes regulations, which are preserved complexes of previous orders, useful because 
situations will often occur within the same configuration of a limited number of 
meaningful factors. Plans and regulations are not only possible, but also necessary in the 
military system because of the inherent danger in military operations. If actions are not 
well coordinated, more soldiers may die and consequently the morale may drop. Both 
these developments are detrimental to the system as a whole. To achieve good 
coordination, plans and regulations are needed and orders must be followed.  
 
If military coordination is to succeed, orders need to be distinguishable from other forms 
of communication. The distinguishing feature of an order is that the rank of the originator 
is superior to that of the recipient, and this automatically makes a strictly hierarchical 
structure, a chain of command, necessary to any military organization. An order is thus a 
communication with a rank attached to it, so that it only allows for a very limited range of 
responses. It naturally excludes the exchange of arguments. 
 
The immediacy of situations facing soldiers usually leaves little time for deliberation 
anyway and makes them even more inclined to follow orders. This need for speed is a 
theme that runs through virtually all military communications. It increases the utility of 
orders and officers’ knowledge of plans and rules of engagement, so that no time is wasted 
on detailed explanation. Modern technology has made it possible to devastate the largest 
nations in the world, including their war-making capabilities, overnight (Rhodes, 1995: 
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575). It was therefore understandable that during the crisis the JCS emphasized the 
importance of speed and the specific military forms of communication so strongly. 
 
Orders have a clear origin and destination. Their reproduction is as finite as the chain of 
command, except when the execution of orders produces results of specific meaning to the 
military rationale. When no such meaningful results are available the production of 
military communication depends on original decisions produced externally, the prime 
movers being politicians, and the military “system” is not independent or self-organizing, 
but an extension of politics. This seems to be the case in times of peace. The operations of 
the military in peacetime are the result of politically approved programs that do not by 
themselves produce new programs and can offer continuity only in the form of repetition. 
In order to continually produce communications within the military, communications 
partners are needed that stand outside of a unilinear hierarchy, and this role can be fulfilled 
by an enemy or a virtual enemy. 
    
The confrontation between enemies can thus contribute to bringing the military system 
into a self-organizing mode. Meaningful “results” occur most clearly during actual 
military confrontations. The elementary units of military confrontations between opposing 
military forces are hostilities, which are similar to orders in being expressions of the 
medium of silencing/destructive power or force . Hostilities are produced by orders, which 
are recursively produced by hostilities, as pre-established plans, regulations and objectives 
refer to hostilities and assign military meaning to them. Reflexively, the confrontation of 
orders, plans and regulations with actual hostilities produces new meanings for potential 
future hostilities and orders.  
 
During a war (a state in which hostility is sanctioned) this could lead without interference 
to an endless and independent chain of military interactions if plans, regulations and 
objectives are adequately developed to give meaning to what happens “on the ground.” 
These meanings are then not produced by non-military interference or by the inspiration of 
individual commanders, but are the results of the systems own inner logic. The 
confrontation between two opposing military organizations can thus form a self-
organizing or autopoietic system. The enemies are an integral part of this autopoietic 
system, which exists until one side is destroyed or peace is made. The importance of pre-
established regulations, which are basically complexes of preserved previous orders, in 
propelling the military system into autopoietic mode implies an historical development 
from an extension of politics to an autopoietic system, with a stage of semi-dormant 
autopoiesis (autopoiesis only in wartime) as the missing link. 
 
The Relations Between the Military and Political Subsystems 
 
The most obvious aspect of the interaction between the political and military systems is 
the constitutional authority of the political system. The explanation for the prevalence of 
the political system finds its origin in the larger social framework in which both these 
systems are embedded. The political system is more closely attached to the rest of society 
than the military because of its internal need for representations of the other systems of 
society. The process of homogenizing the concerns of these different systems, as 
perceived by the political system at least, or of somehow fitting them all into a larger 
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picture in order to select or export a representation of the society, makes the political 
system the natural forum for decision-making within society under peacetime conditions.  
 
The political system not only generates representations of society, but also adjusts society 
itself to conform to this representation (Scott, 1998: 80-83). The political system can thus 
be considered as the center of its society’s network; its influence within society arises 
from the use that all other systems are able to make of it for their own ends (Parsons, 
1963b). It forms a natural link for society’s systems to call upon when they require the 
allocation of resources from another system. The political representation of the military 
system, for example, which can be considered as an interactive interface, functions as the 
military’s tie to the market and other social subsystems. When the military needs money, 
generally healthier recruits or more highly educated physicists to design new weaponry, it 
appeals to the political system to arrange this for them. The quid pro quo for this service is 
recognition of the ultimate authority of politics over military affairs, which in turn is very 
useful to the political system’s own goals. 
  
The relation of the political system with the military can, under normal circumstances, be 
expected to be twofold. First, the political system entertains representations of the 
importance of the military’s position in the political evaluation of society. This assigned 
importance then decides the degree to which political units can attempt to export that 
military system or expand its military influence. For example, the German army can claim 
only a very modest role in the political configuration of the German Federal Republic, 
whereas the United States is able to control and organize NATO’s forces in accordance 
with its own model to such an extent that the American President appoints the Supreme 
Allied Commander.  
 
This strategic position of the U.S. played a role during the Cuban missile crisis. The 
commander of NATO at that time was Lauris Norstad, who had been appointed by 
President Eisenhower. President Kennedy personally delayed the scheduled appointment 
of General Lemnitzer, the ex-chairman of the JCS, as Norstad’s successor on the day 
before the quarantine of Cuba went into effect (May and Zelikow, 2002: 216). At that 
moment, a further strengthening of the integration of the international arena with the 
American military was no longer in the interests of American politics.  
 
Secondly, political units use their interfaces with and their authority over the military to 
more effectively persuade other political actors. The threat of authorizing military action is 
a powerful tool to convince others to adopt foreign customs, such as free trade or 
democracy. The military system can also be used to fight competing units over territory or 
resources that a political unit wants to incorporate, or to deter attacks. In the spirit of Von 
Clausewitz, the exercise of military power is for the political system always a means to an 
end (Von Clausewitz, 1832). The expansion, however, of the military model is, as an 
expression of hegemonic power, an end in itself.  
 
As explained above, the continuity of military interactions was long dependent on political 
decisions. It is not difficult to sketch the historical development that weakened and 
eventually broke this dependence in the industrialized world. The rationalization of 
military affairs after 1870 led to the detailed specification of grand strategies (e.g., the 
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Schlieffen Plan of 1905) and the establishment of routines for large-scale mobilizations. In 
terms of actual combat, however, the stand-off in the trenches of World War I painfully 
demonstrated the limitations of fighting according to the principles of previous wars. 
Political action was still required to prevent the endless repetition of doomed assaults.  
 
During the Interbellum armies were refashioned to be more responsive to technological 
developments and more adaptable. The extreme ravages of World War II and the creation 
of nuclear weapons subsequently made the costs of total war seem prohibitively high to 
politicians. As a result, the definition of “war” was broadened to encompass potentially 
hostile behavior. Potential hostilities became as militarily meaningful as actual hostilities. 
The Cold War was invented, thereby adding a reflexive level to military operations, the 
level of the virtual enemy, whose behavior in an imagined wartime situation had to be 
constantly imagined and reimagined on the basis of military intelligence. As Eisenhower 
had predicted, the new situation developed into a relentless arms race after the Sputnick 
shock. This arms race effectively made the military autopoietic under the conditions of 
formal peace.  
 
Over roughly the same period, the political system made progressively less use of 
hierarchical forms of organizations and interaction (at least in the West). The transition 
from constitutionally self-limiting “nightwatch states” to socially involved welfare states 
occurred (Luhmann 1990a: 169-171). Because the political system—still mainly organized 
in national units—could not fully control the international developments of social systems 
it was increasingly concerned with, the political system needed to function less 
hierarchically. This development widened the schism with the military system.  
 
But eEven when the military system achieves a state of autopoiesis and therefore becomes 
a functionally differentiated system—perhaps, only temporarily—it remains structurally 
coupled to the political system in the longer run. Being a consumer rather than a producer, 
the military system needs the political system to secure its provisions. But like any inferior 
partner in a relationship, especially one with so much inherent power, the military can turn 
on its master or at least try to break free. This could happen if it has repeatedly been 
frustrated by the political system, which was in fact the case in the period leading up to the 
Cuban missile crisis. When the Bay of Pigs invasion was being planned, a significant 
window seemed to open up for U.S. military deployment. Fighter-planes were already 
manned to assist the Cuban rebels when the President decided against overt military 
support (White, 2001: 29). The military machine had started up, but was ordered suddenly 
to halt. It had accomplished nothing. Nevertheless, it received part of the blame for the 
fiasco. Another instance was the prospect of military intervention in Laos, which was also 
blocked by the administration (May and Zelikow, 2002: 122).  
 
Given these experiences, the JCS did not want to be restrained again when the missile 
crisis started, and the chiefs of staff were prepared to risk a global war for the chance to 
attack Cuba. Consequently, they pressured the President to commit to his own statements 
of the previous September, that he would not allow offensive weapons in Cuba, and were 
overwhelmingly convinced that an expanded air strike was the only appropriate action. 
Except for General Taylor, they also insisted on a follow-up invasion of Cuba. Even Navy 
Chief of Staff Admiral George Anderson, who might have been expected to support the 
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blockade option as a chance to show off the navy’s competence, tried to convince 
Kennedy that an expanded air strike was a preferable alternative (May and Zelikow, 2002: 
114-115).  
 
Two American Faces of Conflict 
 
“An invasion would have been a mistake. But the military are mad. They wanted to 
do this.” - President John F. Kennedy (Allison, 1969: 364)  
 
This statement by Kennedy after the crisis illustrates his assessment of the advice that he 
received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His brother was even more forceful in his 
rejection, asserting in his memoirs of the crisis that the military representatives to the 
President, apart from General Taylor, always assumed that the Russians and the Cubans 
would not respond to attacks and that war was in the American national interest. In 
another chapter he recalled all the times “the military [would] take positions which, if 
wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know” (Kennedy, 
1969: 48 and 119).  
 
Not all disagreements and misunderstandings came purely from the JCS’s desire to go to 
war. The military emphasis on speed, their rules and regulations, and the significance of 
orders conflicted sharply with political provisionality and the tendency to deliberate. 
When President Kennedy tried to make sure during the crisis that the American nuclear 
missiles in Turkey and Italy could not be fired without his express orders, the JCS 
protested heavily because that implied to them a lack of confidence in standing orders 
(May and Zelikow, 2002, 141). When both Kennedys objected to performing a “Pearl 
Harbor attack” on the missile sites and on Cuban airfields, General Taylor argued that 
secrecy was an integral part of military operations and that giving up this advantage was 
simply stupid. The President, however, “put the JCS cynicism in his pocket and looked for 
rainbows.” (Brugioni, 1990: 245).  
 
Differences in thinking were perhaps most clearly noted by former President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, who supported the proposed blockade even though as a former general he 
added that he thought a surprise attack would be the best thing to do militarily (May and 
Zelikow, 2002: 142). Above all, the military pressed for a quick decision from the 
President, fearing that Cuban and Soviet preparations were steadily making an attack more 
difficult and that the missiles might be hidden from sight overnight, while the President’s 
intention was to give the Soviets some time to retreat. 
 
Another point of contention was the actual significance of nuclear missiles in Cuba. 
Whereas the military considered them a considerable asset to the overall Soviet threat, the 
politicians seemed not too concerned about the striking power of these missiles. In the 
minds of the President, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara, and others, the missiles in Cuba could in case of nuclear war only add to an 
already unacceptable blow deliverable by missiles based within Russia. But this 
consideration did not prevent the politicians from taking the diplomatic and electoral 
significance of the situation extremely seriously (May and Zelikow, 2002: 60-62). 
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The historical examples invoked by the members of the two subsystems were also very 
different. To his trusted advisors Kennedy, on the one side, mentioned several times 
during the crisis that his reading of Barbara Tuchman’s (1963) book The Guns of August, 
about the outbreak of the First World War, made him very fearful of accidentally initiating 
a series of events that would lead to general war. His concern not to appease the Soviets, 
as the British and the French governments had done with Hitler in 1938, also arose from 
fear of having to face an even greater conflict later on if firm action was not undertaken at 
this time. General LeMay, on the other side, appealed exclusively to the lessons of 
appeasement, specifically recalling the President’s father’s personal role in this historical 
mistake, but only in order to make another point: notably that war was unavoidable. For 
the same reason, the chiefs looked back at the more recent events of the Bay of Pigs and 
Laos as their points of reference. The relevant lesson for them was not how war could be 
prevented, but rather how it could be started. 
 
The belligerence of the military reflects both an assertivity perhaps brought about by its 
newfound partial independence as well as a somewhat outdated desire for war in order to 
gain virtually complete independence of operation. The fact that Admiral Anderson shared 
the opinions of the other JCS members that the air strike was the preferable alternative 
negates the claim of Allison’s organizational model that the Navy (and by extension its 
chief commander) was motivated mainly by a sense of competition with other defense 
organizations. It seems that in this case at least such a sense was trumped by a generalized 
military rationale. 
 
The Dangers of Misunderstanding  
 
True danger of escalation came from incidents in the field that could easily be 
misunderstood by the Soviets. These incidents were the result of military operating rules 
and the political ignorance or neglect thereof. One of these operating rules stated that a 
naval blockade line should be out of reach of enemy aircraft, which amounted to an arc 
500 miles out from Cuba (Brugioni, 1990: 381). When the British ambassador Ormsby-
Gore suggested a day before the quarantine went into effect that the arc should be drawn 
closer to Cuba in order to give Khrushchev more time to decide what to do, the U.S. 
President agreed. Admiral Anderson, the Navy Chief of Staff, angrily protested against 
this transgression of naval guidelines, before yielding to Kennedy’s wishes. Allison has 
even suggested that the Navy did not move some of its intercepting ships at all, increasing 
the chances of a confrontation (Allison, 1971:130). Naval ships trailed Soviet submarines 
far beyond even the 500-mile arc. Upon hearing this information, it was Defense Secretary 
McNamara’s turn to become furious. He called it an irresponsible and unordered 
provocation. Admiral Anderson replied that it was standard naval procedure in case of a 
blockade. McNamara did not accept this as a valid argument (Brugioni, 1990: 415-417).  
 
In order to achieve its purpose of launching war, even standard regulations were disobeyed 
by the military. On Wednesday, October 24, General Thomas Powers, commander of the 
Strategic Air Command, issued the order to his troops to move up to DefCon 2, the last 
preparatory step before general war. Powers’ order, however, was transmitted in the clear, 
in such a way that the Soviets monitoring American transmissions could understand it. 
This went against standard procedure that dictates that a rise in Defense Condition should 
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be transmitted in code. This insolent action on the part of Powers can only be interpreted 
as a deliberate provocation, since the prospect of the American nuclear fleet in full 
readiness could have made the Soviets decide that an escalation on their part had become 
unavoidable (Blight, Allyn, and Welch, 1993: 468; Rhodes, 1995: 572-573). 
 
The political leadership acted irresponsibly as well in the sense that they were often 
ambiguous in their instructions to the military. They did not fully realize the significance 
of standing orders, treating them as if they had the same provisional status as political 
communications. In a briefing of ExCom before the quarantine went into effect, Admiral 
Anderson related the Navy’s intention to fire on ships in order to disable their rudder if 
they tried to proceed past the quarantine line. The President agreed and issued the 
appropriate orders. When the situation actually occurred at the height of the crisis and 
Anderson prepared to give the order to fire, the strongest confrontation between Anderson 
and McNamara took place. Anderson had had it with McNamara and told the Secretary 
that he should not interfere, as the Navy had been handling blockades “since John Paul 
Jones”. McNamara replied that he did not “give a damn about John Paul Jones” and that 
there would be no firing on Soviet ships (May and Zelikow, 2002: 140 and Brugioni, 
1990: 474).  
 
On the same day an American spy plane was shot down over Cuba and the pilot killed. 
The JCS had made it very clear during an earlier meeting that if their planes were shot at, 
an immediate retaliatory strike would follow on the Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) site 
from which shots were fired. When General LeMay was informed about the incident, he 
immediately readied fighter planes to destroy the SAM site. Just before these planes took 
off, a frantic call came from the White House instructing him to ignore the standing order 
and not to proceed with the attack. Understandably from their perspective, LeMay and 
Taylor were now furious (Brugioni, 1990: 463-464). 
 
The most dangerous incident during the crisis was the result of a standing order being 
executed. Three days into the quarantine and with tensions heightened, the SAC allowed a 
test launch of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) across the Pacific Ocean. At 
this point in the crisis, the Vandenberg base, from which this missile was launched, was 
already fully armed for an attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviets therefore could not be 
sure that this missile was not directed at them and carrying a nuclear warhead. Despite the 
obvious danger of such an action at this moment in time, the Air Force proceeded 
according to their missile-testing schedule, which had been formally approved by the 
President long before the beginning of the crisis. 
 
Conclusions and discussion 
 
At a conference with Cuban and Russian officials, thirty years after the crisis, Robert 
McNamara surely exaggerated the control exercised by the civilian government over the 
military when he claimed that: 
 
“There’s nothing—and I mean literally nothing—involving any significant military 
action that did not occur as a result of the decision of the President, through the 
Secretary of Defense.” (Blight, Allyn and Welch, 1993: 158) 
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Perhaps in retrospect a missile test or General Powers’ unsanctioned reporting of a rise in 
alert may not seem like significant military actions until we remember that, if these had 
sparked off a nuclear war, there might have been nobody left to take a retrospective 
perspective. The underestimation of the differences in focus between the military and 
political systems posed serious danger during the missile crisis. This source of danger 
added to an already extremely dangerous international conflict.  
 
Politicians should realize reflexively what they are dealing with. The problem of 
miscommunication between the two systems is a structural one and should be recognized 
as such. It cannot be solved simply by replacing military commanders whose attitude has 
been exceptionally dangerous. General Taylor was as much of an exception as General 
LeMay. Stripping the military of all its autonomy is no solution either. As much as the 
military attitude worried him at times, even Kennedy recognized that it might be more 
dangerous if the commanders would not be willing to go to war at all (Kennedy, 1969: 
119). Many of the incidents described above, however, could have been prevented if the 
politicians had shown more caution in their handling of the military.  
 
For the military, an order is an order, and it lacks the provisionality to which politicians 
are accustomed. This obligates politicians to think very carefully about their own 
intentions before issuing military orders, since they may not always be reversible, and to 
keep a careful track of standing orders. It also obligates them to study military plans, 
regulations and rules of engagement closely to know exactly what a specific order implies. 
Paradoxically, McNamara was right by claiming political leadership: most of the 
dangerous actions the military took during the crisis were indeed implied in the 
Presidential orders. Neither the President nor the Secretary, however, was aware of the 
implications of previously issued orders. 
 
The expectation of a structural solution to this problem, however, seems utopian. The self-
reform required to sensitize the political system to military rigidity would inevitably lead 
to a systemic paradox. This problem emerges from the general paradox of self-reference 
(Luhmann 1990a). Only through the use of arguments, advice and recommendations can 
the political system initiate and realize self-reform. Unfortunately, in this case, it is exactly 
the provisionality inherent in these forms of communication that would be in need of 
reform.  
 
The same reasoning goes for military reform. The only way it would be able to lessen the 
rigidities of orders is through issuing orders to that effect. Even if the addition of more 
reflexive levels to the military system may make it less hierarchical in the future, it is 
unlikely it will in this way bridge the gap with a political system that remains in constant 
development itself, especially because the military medium (force) is inherently more 
hierarchical. However, due to their structural coupling the two systems will continuously 
adapt to each other as long as there is no upsetting international confrontation. This 
balance between the subsystems thus can be different under wartime or peacetime 
conditions. 
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Most of the problems facing the Americans when handling the Cuban missile crisis can be 
attributed to the differences in the orientation and the operations of the political and 
military systems. The extent of the functional differentiation of a discourse of persuasion 
and a process of destruction turned decidedly dysfunctional at this critical moment. This 
explanation has considerable advantages over earlier explanations.  
 
Contrary to earlier theoretical models that have been applied to this crisis, our explanation 
enables us to view the deliberations of the government and the operations of the military 
within the same framework. The special characteristics of both systems have been 
examined, whereas the organizational model viewed the Kennedy administration as a 
“rational” entity whose rationality was however severely bounded by government 
organizations that presented it with a very limited number of alternatives. We have shown 
that the Kennedy administration in fact came up with, and eventually—although 
imperfectly and with much difficultly—succeeded in implementing, resolutions that 
deviated from any of the alternatives presented to it, for example by conceiving of a 
completely original type of blockade. The sociocybernetic analysis has the advantage of 
being specifically designed to meet the challenges of symbolic mediation, around which 
this case obviously revolved. Allison’s (1971) organizational model instead used a static 
theory interested mainly in identifying organizational structures. (The two other models 
Allison proposed did not take a structural perspective at all.)  
 
Our analysis is also able to resolve several contradictions in Allison’s organizational 
analysis, which were the result of the rigidity of his model. It explains why the 
Commander in Chief of Naval Operations initially favored an expanded air strike followed 
up by an invasion, which offered far less scope for naval participation than a blockade. It 
also clarifies how, prior to the crisis, the Secretary of State Dean Rusk and later his 
undersecretary George Ball could shelve Kennedy’s strict instructions to remove 
American missiles from Turkish soil after the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Turkish 
Ambassador warned them not to. Without further specification, Allison presented this 
incident in defense of the organizational model. It seems clear, however, that not the 
operational procedures of the State Department (which cannot be designed to obey foreign 
leaders in conflict with presidential instructions), but rather the ever shifting power 
differentials acting upon political discourse and the resulting provisionality of political 
decisions explain this failure of compliance. Finally, our account allows the reader to place 
the occurrences within a context of historical development, and can therefore take more 
information into account than the more static organizational model.   
 
The application of the communication systems model was fruitful in this study, but our 
story has remained a single case study. In order to understand the larger applicability of 
this definition of the military and of politics in systems theoretical terms and of systems 
theory in general, much more work needs to be done. After examining the American side 
of the crisis, an interesting place to start would be to examine what happened on the Soviet 
and Cuban sides, and to see if their crisis handling was similarly affected by systemic 
problems. Such an inquiry would go a long way towards determining the real explanatory 
power of this model for modern conflicts and shed more light on the differentiations this 
analysis has proposed recursively to Luhmann’s systems theory. By proposing the concept 
of a “semi-dormant autopoietic system” that is located clearly in time and international 
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“space”, it reestablishes a need to differentiate sociocybernetic analysis with reference to 
regional contingencies and national history.  
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Notes 
 
1. Allison’s (1971) two other models are (1) the rational actor model that serves to 
highlight the strategic significance and justification of government decisions and (2) 
the bureaucratic model that analyzes the major policy decisions as the results of 
bargaining between several important players and different interests within the 
government. 
2. Luhmann sees a fundamental incompatibility between functionalist sociology and 
religion, as recognition of the functions of belief destroys belief itself (Luhmann 
1990c: 157). It is however recognized that modern science developed historically 
under the aegis of an unshakable belief in God and that scientific research was for a 
long time justified in explicitly religious terms (Luhmann, 1990b; Leydesdorff, 2001). 
3. Other definitions of power are certainly possible. Stephen Lukes (1974), for example, 
exposed what he called the third dimension of power, which is radically different from 
our “tug-of-war” conception of power. However, it can be assumed that forms of 
power, hidden in an already constructed social reality, could not have been the basis 
for the construction of an explicit power-wielding discourse. 
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